A Fourth Amendment Approach
to Compulsory Physical Examinations
of Sex Offense Victims
Troy Andrew Eidt
Alleged victims of sex crimes often consent to be physically
examined by the prosecution's medical experts. Prosecutors have a
constitutional duty to disclose their physicians' findings to the defense if they contain exculpatory evidence.' But does due process
entitle defendants' experts to probe the victim's body for evidence-even if the complainant objects? Defendants increasingly
say yes. Some have asserted a due process right to have their own
experts inspect the complainant's vagina or rectum for signs of
sexual penetration.2 Others have argued that the trial court should
use its inherent power to order such examinations-by defense or
independent physicians-and to sanction complainants who refuse
to comply.3
The Supreme Court has not considered whether the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 4 and Fourteenth 5 Amendments extend to
compulsory physical examinations of complainants. 6 If the defendant's constitutional right does not reach that far, does the trial
court nonetheless have the inherent power to order such an exam?
Or do court-mandated vaginal and rectal examinations violate the
complainant's right to be free from unreasonable searches under
7
the Fourth Amendment?
After a brief introduction to the controversy over compulsory
physical examinations, Section II of this Comment discusses the
t A.B. 1986, Stanford University; J.D. Candidate 1991, The University of Chicago.
1 See Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87 (1963) and Section II.
' See Section H.
3

See Section IV.

"No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." US Const, Amend V.
5 "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." US Const, Amend XIV, § 1. This Comment will refer to the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as the "Due Process Clause."
I Petition for certiorari was denied recently in Turner v Commonwealth, 767 SW2d 557
(Ky 1988), cert denied, 110 S Ct 260 (1989).
4

7 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons .

searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....

"

.

. against unreasonable

US Const, Amend IV.
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Supreme Court's due process analysis and concludes that it does
not entitle defendants to compulsory examinations of complainants. Section III reviews the state court decisions that permit such
exams, showing that while these decisions sometimes use the term
"due process," their holdings consistently avoid the Due Process
Clause and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it.
Section IV explores another possible basis for compulsory
physical examinations, the courts' inherent authority to conduct
criminal discovery. The section concludes, however, that this authority is limited by complainants' Fourth Amendment rights, and
Section V shows that the Fourth Amendment protects sex offense
victims from intrusive physical exams.
I.

THE CONTROVERSY OVER COMPULSORY PftysicAL EXAMINATIONS

Physical examinations of complainants play a prominent role
in many sex offense prosecutions. Ideally, the prosecution's physician inspects the complainant immediately after the alleged sexual
contact to test for residual semen and other transitory evidence. s
An immediate examination can also increase the accuracy of the
medical conclusions.9 In practice, however, the physician often cannot examine the complainant until several months after the most
recent incident of alleged sexual penetration. Yet even under these
circumstances, a physical examination is sometimes probative. Injuries to the hymenal ring of young girls, for instance, can produce
scar tissue that lasts for years. The physical characteristics and location of the scarring may lead experts to attribute the injury specifically to male sexual penetration. 10
Though no state requires that the prosecution present medical
evidence of physical penetration to obtain a sex offense conviction 1 the prosecution's medical findings can be powerful tools of
persuasion-especially if the only physician to examine the child
Depending on the nature of the assault, a physical examination may include: an examination of the alleged victim's body for evidence of force or trauma; a thorough pelvic
examination; taking pap smears from the vagina, anus, or mouth; and combing for foreign
pubic hair. See People v Scott, 145 Cal Rptr 876, 578 P2d 123, 131 (1978) (Clark dissenting).
' The California Supreme Court has suggested a rule of thumb: "The more remote the
incidents relied upon, the less probable it is that probative evidence will be discovered." Id
at 128.
10 See Turner v Commonwealth, 767 SW2d 557, 559 (Ky 1988), cert denied, 110 S Ct
260 (1989), where the examining physician testified that penile penetration caused the fouryear-old complainant's hymenal scars. Evidence of penetration can also be important in sodomy cases. Medical experts may attribute rectal scar tissue specifically to penile or digital
penetration. See generally People v Nokes, 183 Cal App 3d 468, 228 Cal Rptr 119 (1986).
12 See, for example, State v Ramos, 553 A2d 1059, 1062-63 (RI 1989).
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personally testifies at trial that the complainant's vagina or rectum
has been sexually penetrated. Prosecutors also use this evidence to
impeach defense experts and to corroborate the sometimes rambling and contradictory testimony of child witnesses. 1 2 Still, the examining physician's opinion is hardly the last word. Physical evidence of penetration loses much of its probative value as the
complainant's age increases; older children and teenagers are more
likely to engage in voluntary sexual contact before and after the
alleged offense. Nor is evidence of penetration tantamount to conviction when younger children are the alleged victims. Someone
other than the defendant-even the children themselves-may
have caused the scars.13 Consequently, prosecution and defense experts often derive different medical conclusions from a single physical examination.
Because few complainants consent to be examined physically
by defendants' experts, accused sex offenders ordinarily wage a
"secondhand defense." This means obtaining the examining physicians' medical reports as provided by federal 4 or state 5 discovery
rules, or by the Brady doctrine, which requires the prosecution to
disclose any evidence in its possession that is exculpatory to the
defendant.' 6 The defense is then free to cross-examine the prosecution's physicians at trial and to present expert testimony challenging their conclusions. This discovery is not as helpful to the de-

12

Turner, 767 SW2d at 558-59.

13 As the Kentucky Supreme Court noted, because "[s]mall girls sometimes masturbate

or insert foreign objects into their vaginas which rupture the hymenal ring," it is a matter of
expert opinion whether penile penetration caused the injury. Id at 559.
14 FRCrP 16 requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense various medical and
scientific reports, including those pertaining to physical examinations. Section (a)(1)(D)
provides:
Reports of Examinations and Tests. Upon request of a defendant the government shall
permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments, or copies thereof,
which are within the possession, custody, or control of the government, the existence of
which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney
for the government, and which are material to the preparation of the defense or are
intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial.
15Approximately forty states have rules governing defense discovery. Wayne R. LaFave
and Jerold H. Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 19.3 at 483 (West, 1984) ("Treatise"). Some
states follow the federal standard. Others require that the prosecution disclose medical reports if the prosecution intends to use them at trial. But most state rules simply encompass
all such reports "made in connection with the particular case." Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold
H. Israel, Criminal Procedure732 (West, 1985). Nearly all jurisdictions authorize discovery
by the defense of reports and results of medical and physical examinations. LaFave and
Israel, Treatise at 525.
16 Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963). See Section II.
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fendant as it might be. It is understandable that juries could be
inclined to give greater credence to the examining physician than
to an equally competent medical expert who has not personally inspected the complainant. 17 Of course, if the trial court is concerned
that the prosecution's medical findings are misleading or inaccurate, it can always exclude the evidence. But assuming that the
prosecution's physician is highly credible to the jury, does it violate
due process to prevent the defendant's experts from probing inside
the complainant's vagina or rectum for evidence?
In answering no, some prosecutors have echoed the Supreme
Court's admonition that "[t]here is no general constitutional right
to discovery in a criminal case."'" They fear that compulsory physical examinations of complainants will make it more difficult to detect and deter sex crimes, in which the victim is often the sole witness. Prosecutors also raise the specter of the courts' practice in
the 1940s and '50s of routinely subjecting adult rape victims to
psychiatric examinations,' 9 and warn that today's defendants could
similarly intimidate victims of child molestation.
II. DuE PROCESS AND DIscOvERY: THE SUPREME COURT CASES
Criminal discovery did not exist at the time of the Constitution's framing.20 It was not until 1963 that the Supreme Court first
interpreted the Due Process Clause to require the prosecution to
2
disclose exculpatory evidence in its possession to the defendant. '
State v Drab, 546 S2d 54, 56 (Fla Dist Ct App 1989), review denied, 553 S2d
1164 (Fla 1989) (rejecting this contention as a justification for compulsory physical exam).
18Weatherford v Bursey, 429 US 545, 559 (1977).
19Dean Wigmore led the charge in favor of mandatory psychiatric examinations, proposing in his 1940 treatise on evidence that "[n]o judge should ever let a sex-offence [sic]
charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental makeup
have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician." John Henry Wigmore, 3 Evidence § 924(a) at 460 (Little, Brown, 3d ed 1940). See Section IV.
court
10 As the Florida Supreme Court observed, "the common law does not authorize a
was
cases
criminal
in
discovery
because
witness,
a
of
to require the physical examination
unknown to the common law." State v Smith, 260 S2d 489, 491 (Fla 1972).
to expand
21 Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87 (1963). The Court has generally declined
criminal discovery further, despite ample opportunities to do so. The proper scope of criminal discovery was hotly debated a generation ago, but has now been largely resolved by
legislation or court rules. LaFave and Israel, 2 Treatise at 474 (cited in note 15). Proponents
of liberal discovery stress the need to protect innocent defendants and to avoid surprise at
trial. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for
Truth?, 1963 Wash U L Q 279; and Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal
Discovery, 39 NYU L Rev 228 (1964).
Opponents of liberal discovery are concerned with reciprocity. They note that the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination limits the legislature's ability to provide for
extensive prosecution discovery from the defense. LaFave and Israel, Treatise at 476. See
See
1'7
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Defendants have frequently asserted a due process right to have
their experts inspect all prosecutorial files. Instead, the Court has
required disclosure only of evidence that a prosecutor exercising
due diligence would determine to be exculpatory. 22 This duty extends only to evidence in the prosecution's possession.2 3
The Court has essentially viewed the appropriate scope of defense discovery as a matter of state legislative or judicial policy,
within certain constitutional limits. 24 The best known decision is
Brady v Maryland, which required the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense before trial if the defendant demands it. Defendant Brady, who faced a first-degree murder
charge, demanded that the prosecution reveal all extrajudicial
statements made by his accomplice concerning the crime. After the
trial court convicted Brady and sentenced him to death, he learned
that the prosecution had withheld a key statement in which the
accomplice confessed that he, and not Brady, had done the killing.2 5 The Supreme Court held that withholding exculpatory evidence violates due process "where the evidence is material either
to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
26
of the prosecution.
The Court broadened the Brady doctrine in United States v
Agurs, which established that the prosecution has an affirmative
duty to disclose exculpatory information in its possession even if
the defendant has not specifically demanded it. Yet the duty to
disclose is a limited one: "If everything that might influence a jury
must be disclosed," the Court warned, "the only way a prosecutor
could discharge his constitutional duty would be to allow complete
discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice. '27 More significantly, Agurs made the prosecution responsible for determining
what evidence is exculpatory and therefore must be disclosed to
also Judge Learned Hand's famous articulation of this view in United States v Garsson, 291
F Supp 646, 649 (S D NY 1923) ("Under our criminal procedure the accused has every
advantage."). Finally, other commentators fear that expansive discovery will permit defense
counsel to intimidate witnesses and facilitate perjury by enabling defendants to fabricate a
defense after the fact, particularly since the prosecution cannot depose the defendant.
LaFave and Israel, Treatise at 476-81.
22 The constitutional obligation to disclose depends not on the prosecution's good or
bad faith, but on the materiality of the evidence: "If evidence highly probative of innocence
is in his file, [the prosecutor] should be presumed to recognize its significance even if he has
actually overlooked it." United States v Agurs, 427 US 97, 110 (1976).
23 Id at 106-07, 111.
2 LaFave and Israel, Treatise at 481 (cited in note 15).
"s 373 US 83, 87 (1963).
26Id at 87.
7 427 US 97, 108-09 (1976) (footnote omitted).
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the defendant. The Court might have given defense experts the
right to scour the prosecution's files for material evidence. Instead,
the Court determined that "[w]hether or not procedural rules authorizing such broad discovery might be desirable, the Constitution
' 28
surely does not demand that much.

The Court applied the doctrine of limited criminal discovery
to a child molestation case for the first time in Pennsylvania v
Ritchie. Defendant Ritchie was convicted of raping his thirteenyear-old daughter. He subpoenaed the child protective services'
files pertaining to her, but the agency refused to comply on the
grounds that its records were privileged by statute and could be
disclosed only to a "court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a
court order." 29 The defendant then sought to have his experts inspect the files, but the trial judge refused. A divided Supreme
Court held that Ritchie might have been denied a fair trial and
remanded the case so that the trial court-not defense counsel-could conduct the inspection."0
At first glance, Ritchie appears to strike a blow at
prosecutorial discretion by compelling an in camera inspection of
the agency's files. But this conclusion is unwarranted. In Ritchie,
the prosecution lacked access to the agency's files and was unaware of their contents;3 ' the Pennsylvania statute barred disclosure
to all but the court.32 Ritchie, then, did not address the scope of
prosecutorial disclosure since prosecutors never possessed the evidence sought by the defense. What Ritchie did do was reiterate
that due process does not entitle defendants to inspect government
files. As Justice Powell wrote for the Court:
28 Id at 109. Relying on the prosecution to disclose material evidence could admittedly
lead to abuses. For instance, the examining physician and the prosecutor might conspire to
withhold medical evidence from the defendant. See Turner v Ward, 321 F2d 918 (10th Cir
1963) (reversible error where prosecutor instructed examining physician to testify in deliberately vague terms about medical findings of complainant's physical condition so that government could convict defendant of rape instead of less serious offense of sodomy). Nonetheless, the Court has insisted that it is the prosecution that decides which information
must be disclosed, even though allowing complete discovery "may be helpful to a defendant
in ferreting out information." Pennsylvania v Ritchie, 480 US 39, 59 (1987).
" 480 US at 43-44. The statute provided that "reports made pursuant to this act including but not limited to report summaries of child abuse ... and written reports... as
well as any other information obtained, reports written or photographs or x-rays taken concering alleged instances of child abuse in the possession of the ... agency... shall be
confidential.... ." Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2215(a) (Purdon Supp 1989).
0 480 US at 58.
31 Id at 44 n 4.
32 Id at 43-44.
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To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of case
would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's compelling
interest in protecting its child abuse information. If the
[agency] records were made available to defendants, even
through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on
[the state's] efforts to uncover and treat abuse. s
The Court noted further that child abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute because the victim is often the
sole witness. "The Commonwealth's purpose would be frustrated,"
the Court concluded, "if this confidential material had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant charged with criminal child
abuse." 4
In sum, the Court's decisions reveal that due process does not
entitle defendants to obtain compulsory physical examinations of
their alleged victims. Although the Court has ordered the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence in its possession, such as the
written confession in Brady, it has consistently barred the defense
from inspecting prosecutorial evidence firsthand with an advocate's
eye toward what is and is not material. By this principle, the prosecution would have a duty to disclose medical reports pertaining to
a physical examination of the complainant if they contain exculpatory evidence. But the prosecution cannot disclose what it does not
have. Because the prosecution does not possess the complainant's
vagina or rectum, it cannot "disclose" them to the defendant's experts via a compulsory physical examination. 5

33
4

Id at 60.
Id at 61.

A complainant is arguably in the prosecution's "possession" in the sense that the
prosecution may (through the court) subpoena witnesses and compel them to testify under
threat of contempt. This type of possession is hardly absolute, however. The contempt
power--coercive civil confinement or a separate criminal prosecution against a witness who
willfully defies the court-necessarily ends where the complainant's Fourth Amendment
rights begin. And even the grand jury is "without power to invade a legitimate privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment." United States v Calandra, 414 US 343, 346
(1974). Moreover, since the defendant lacks a due process right to obtain a physical examination if the complainant refuses, it would make no difference if the court appointed an
independent expert to inspect the complainant's vagina or rectum instead of the defendant's
expert of choice. In either case, the state court's ability to expand criminal discovery beyond
what the Due Process Clause requires must cease when it collides with the alleged victim's
constitutionally protected dignity interests. See Section V.
35
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STATE COURTS THAT ORDER PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS IN THE

NAME OF "DuE PROCESS"

A number of state courts have held that due process entitles
accused sex offenders to compulsory physical examinations of complainants. These courts are divided, however, as to the circumstances that trigger this entitlement. Still, the decisions do share a
striking feature: they avoid mentioning the text of the Constitution
and the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting it. This is no minor
oversight. Given the Supreme Court's limited recognition of criminal discovery rights under the Due Process Clause, these state
courts are plainly not engaged in proper federal constitutional
decisionmaking, even though they sometimes use the term "due
process" to justify outcomes in the cases before them. 6
This section reviews, in turn, the various "due process" approaches that state courts have employed to assess a defendant's
asserted right to compel a physical examination of the complainant. First is Kentucky's "material assistance" inquiry, which requires an examination when the evidence sought is likely to help
the defendant prepare for trial. Second are two types of "compelling need" inquiries-an ad hoc balancing approach and a factorbased balancing approach-that loosely balance the defendant's
interest in the evidence against the burden the examination would
impose on the complainant. Third, the section considers the "exculpatory evidence" approach, which allows the defendant a physical examination only if the evidence likely to be obtained could
absolutely bar his conviction. Fourth, the section discusses the
"medical deficiency" standard, which permits an examination only
if the prosecution's exam failed to conform to proper medical procedures. The section concludes by reviewing the state court cases
that do ground their analysis in the Due Process Clause. These dell

Of course, these courts could be basing their decisions on their state constitutions'

analogues to the Due Process Clause. Beginning with Professor Donald Wilkes's influential
article, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure:State Court Evasion of the Burger
Court, 62 Ky L J 421 (1974), commentators have frequently discussed the willingness of
some state courts to preserve and expand the liberal discovery doctrines of the Warren
Court. These courts have provided the accused greater protection by interpreting state con-

stitutional provisions more expansively than the Burger and Rehnquist courts construed
identical or parallel provisions of the federal Bill of Rights. See Yale Kamisar, Wayne R.
LaFave, and Jerold H. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure 63-68 (West, 6th ed 1986). But
even assuming this is the case here, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches should restrict a defendant's ability
to obtain a compulsory physical examination of the complainant in a sex offense prosecution. See Section V.
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cisions have correctly rejected defense demands for compulsory
physical examinations.
A.

The Turner Material Assistance Approach

In Turner v Commonwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court
held that the defendant was entitled "as a matter of due process
and fairness" to have his own expert physically examine the complainant because the examination could lead to evidence "of material assistance to [him] in his cross-examination" of the prosecution's physician.37 The defendant in Turner had been convicted of
first-degree rape and first-degree sexual abuse of his four-year-old
daughter. The Kentucky Supreme Court acknowledged that his
daughter's testimony, regardless of the medical evidence, was sufficient to permit a jury to find the defendant guilty. Nonetheless,
the court reversed the defendant's conviction on the grounds that
denying his request for a second physical examination of the complainant violated due process. "In this case," the Turner court
said, "the alleged victim was only four years old. The physical examination of the child by an independent expert might have permitted the appellant to offer evidence to contradict that offered by
the Commonwealth as to whether there were, in fact, any injuries
to the hymenal ring." Had an independent expert found the same
injury, the defendant might have been able "to contradict testimony for the Commonwealth that the location of the injuries indicated the probability of sexual penetration. In any event, the examination of the alleged victim by an independent expert and
consultation with that expert as to the results of the examination
would have been of material assistance to the appellant in his
cross-examination" of the prosecution's physician. 8
B.

The Compelling Need Approaches

Some state courts that have allowed defendants to obtain a
physical examination of the complainant require that there be a
"compelling need" for the evidence likely to be found. Yet jurisdictions disagree as to what this phrase means. The decisions suggest
two distinct approaches to determining compelling need: what this
Comment will call an "ad hoc" balancing approach and a "factor
specific" balancing approach.

767 SW2d 557, 559 (Ky 1988), cert denied, 110 S Ct 260 (1989).
9 Id at 558-59.
37
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The ad hoc balancing approach.

The Illinois Supreme Court applied the ad hoc balancing approach in People v Glover. Although Glover did not involve a request for a gynecological examination, the issues raised by the case
are similar. The defendant in Glover appealed his conviction for
deviate sexual assault against an adult woman and challenged the
quality of her eyesight at the time of the incident. Specifically, he
argued that the trial judge had deprived him of due process by
refusing to order the complainant to submit to an ophthalmological examination, claiming that "it was dark at the time of the assault and the examination was necessary to determine her ability
to see and identify the defendant."3 9 The Illinois Supreme Court
rejected this theory, explaining that, in weighing the competing
considerations, there was no compelling reason for ordering an examination. The court did not elaborate as to what these considerations were, beyond identifying the defendant's request and its relative insignificance given the other evidence against him.
Similarly, in State v Garrett the Minnesota Court of Appeals
reversed a trial court order mandating a physical examination of
the rape complainant, the defendant's fifteen-year-old daughter.
The complainant's attorney had informed the judge that
"'[f]rankly, if the Court orders [the examination], she would go
ahead with it,'" but the court held that the defense had failed to
demonstrate the requisite compelling need. The court was unconvinced that a second examination-which the defendant hoped
would reveal that the complainant had never had sexual intercourse, and therefore that he could not have raped her-"would
reveal anything probative for [the defendant]." Instead, it "would
constitute an unnecessary annoyance and embarrassment to the
complainant." Without further explanation, the Garrett court recognized that trial judges have "some discretion" in ordering physical examinations but warned that "[o]nly a rare case would justify
such an order based upon a showing of compelling need."'40 Unlike
Glover, which balanced the defendant's request for new evidence
against the probability that it might affect the outcome of the case,
Garrett weighed the defendant's need for the evidence in view of
the harm a court-ordered physical examination would impose on
the complainant.
49 IIl 2d 78, 273 NE2d 367, 369 (1971).

384 NW2d 617, 619 (Minn App 1986). The court stressed that "[a]t trial, respondent
will be able to cross-examine both the complainant and the doctor who performed her physical examination."
40
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Glover and Garrettboth announce a compelling need standard
but give trial courts virtually no guidance in determining when the
defendant may obtain a compulsory physical examination of the
complainant. Consequently, these ad hoc balancing "tests" are little more than assertions of highly fact-based conclusions.
2. The factor-based balancing approach.
Rhode Island is the only jurisdiction to adopt a second approach to determining compelling need, a factor-based balancing
test. The test lists several specific considerations the trial judge
must weigh in determining whether the defendant may obtain a
compulsory physical examination of the complainant. In State v
Ramos, a Rhode Island jury convicted the defendant of repeatedly
raping his twelve-year-old daughter at knifepoint. At trial, the
state called as a witness the gynecologist who had physically examined the complainant a few months after the last alleged attack.
She testified that she was "fairly certain" that the complainant's
vagina had been penetrated. The defendant then moved to compel
the complainant to submit to an independent physical examination
to show "she was'41still a virgin and that the alleged sexual assaults
never occurred.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court observed that it had "never
considered whether a trial justice may compel a complaining witness in a criminal trial to undergo such a physical examination."
The Ramos court then proceeded to articulate the following balancing test:
[T]he trial justice should consider: (1) the complainant's age,
(2) the remoteness in time of the alleged criminal incident to
the proposed examination, (3) the degree of intrusiveness and
humiliation associated with the procedure, (4) the potentially
debilitating physical effects of such an examination, and (5)
any other relevant considerations.42
In rejecting the defendant's request, the Ramos court did not indicate the relative weight trial courts should give each of these fac41 553 A2d 1059, 1060-62 (RI 1989). The state's expert physician stated that although
she found no obvious carnncle or torn edges of the hymen generally associated only with
childbirth or very traumatic intercourse, the complainant's hymen was stretched, allowing
for easy penetration into her vagina. Thus, comparing her examination of the complainant
to vaginal examinations performed on other thirteen-year-old females, the physician concluded that she was "fairly certain" the complainant's vagina had been sexually penetrated.
42 Id at 1062.
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tors. Nor did it suggest what "other relevant considerations" might
be.
C.

The Exculpatory Evidence Approach

Rather than engaging in balancing to determine whether the
defendant may have his own physician conduct a physical examination, a handful of jurisdictions have based their decision on
whether the evidence sought would be exculpatory. These courts
have inquired whether the evidence likely to be obtained by a compulsory physical examination could absolutely bar a conviction. If
not, the court should refuse to order such an examination regardless of the circumstances involved.
Practically speaking, the exculpatory evidence approach
should deny a compelled physical examination when (1) the substantive offense does not require proof of physical penetration; or
(2) the offense requires a finding of sexual penetration but the
factfinder is free to determine whether penetration actually occurred by weighing both medical and non-medical evidence. Even
an examination favorable to the defendant could not absolutely assure exoneration in either case; the defendant might still be convicted even if the examination yields no signs of sexual penetration.4 3 Given that even a clear showing of no sexual penetration
might not prove exculpatory, a standard resting an examination order on its "absolutely exculpatory" character should impose an insuperable burden on most defendants.4 4
The California Court of Appeal adopted the exculpatory evidence approach in People v Nokes. The court denied the defendants' motion to compel a physical examination of the complainant because the evidence that might have been obtained would not
have mandated a verdict for the defendants. The Nokes defendants were charged with committing 133 lewd and lascivious acts
against seven children, including vaginal and anal penetration of
their six-year-old daughter and anal penetration of their four-yearold son.45 At a preliminary hearing, the defendants moved for compulsory physical examinations of the daughter and son.46 The mag43

See text at note 11.

41 In theory, a defendant might still satisfy the exculpatory evidence standard if the

prosecution's medical findings are its sole evidence of sexual penetration.
45 183 Cal App 3d 468, 471-72, 228 Cal Rptr 119 (1986).
41 Id at 473-74. The son had not previously undergone any physical examination and
was unwilling to do so. The defendants argued he should submit to an anal examination and
that the daughter should submit to a vaginal and anal examination.

Compulsory Physical Examinations

1990]

istrate refused on the grounds that the proposed examinations
could not exculpate the defendants: the evidence that might be obtained could not by itself establish that the children had not been
molested. The magistrate added that the son's unwillingness to
agree to the examination (he feared it would replicate the alleged
47
abuse) rendered the proposed bodily intrusion impermissible.
The trial court reversed the magistrate's order, but the California
Court of Appeal reinstated it. 48 In doing so, the appellate court
noted that "while signs of scarring from old tears would be positive
evidence that the child had been molested, the absence of such evidence, i.e., normal results of an examination, would not establish
49
that the child had not been molested.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals relied partially on the
exculpatory evidence approach in State v Hewett. The defendant,
who was convicted of repeatedly raping his two young daughters,
had obtained copies of the examining physician's report, which
concluded that the size of the vaginal openings of both girls was
"consistent with," but not "diagnostic of," the kind of sexual abuse
the children had described to him.5 0 The defendant moved to have
his own expert physically examine the daughters, but the trial
judge refused out of concern for the children's well-being and because the evidence sought could not exonerate him. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. It noted that
the evidence sought from a second examination could not exculpate the defendant because the last alleged incident of sexual
abuse had taken place six months earlier, giving the girls' vaginal
51
openings time to constrict to their normal size.

47 Id
48

at 474.

Id at 482.

Id at 480.
50 93 NC App 1, 376 SE2d 467, 470 (1989). The examining physician wrote that the
hymenal ring of the first girl "f[ell] open to some 8 m[illhneters] and ha[d] a thickened
internal edge." This made him believe the ring had "been injured and healed." Id. The
vagina of the second girl "gape[d] to 7 or 8 m[illimeters and the] edge of the hymenal ring
[was] somewhat thickened and g[ave] the impression of having been irritated and healed."
Id. The physician testified that according to the consensus group of the American Medical
Association, a vaginal opening of ten millimeters is "pretty much proof of penetration,"
while an opening of more than four millimeters "is very suggestive of penetration." Id at
471.
5, Id at 471-72. See also Sluka v State, 717 P2d 394, 401 n 6 (Alaska App 1986) (failure
to require a second medical examination for three-year-old assault victim was not error in
absence of a showing as to how the examination would have been probative to defendants).
49
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The Medical Deficiency Approach

Hewett also noted the defense's failure to show that the prosecution's medical findings were deficient.5 2 At least one other court
has. suggested that the defendant must show that the physical examination was conducted improperly. In State v Drab, the defendant, who was charged with sexual battery of a child, moved for a
second gynecological examination of the complainant, his eightyear-old adopted daughter. The Florida District Court of Appeal
prohibited the exam because the defendant "takes issue not with
the qualifications of the original examiner nor with the specifics of
his physical observations, but rather with the conclusions drawn
therefrom. ' 53 The court observed that the defendant "has not alleged that there was anything improper or unprofessional about
the voluntary physical examination of the complaining witness. He
does not urge that the scientific observations that were made are in
any way suspect. He faults only the conclusion that these findings
lend support to the allegations of sexual abuse. ' 54 Because the defendant already had access to the examining physician's medical
report, the court held that the defendant's ability to raise a defense was not infringed.
In addition to proposing a requirement of medical deficiency,
Drab is significant for expressly grounding its analysis in the defendant's right to due process. 55 The other decisions discussed
above-with the exception of the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Turner v Commonwealth56-steered clear of the due process argument even when the defense had raised it.5 7 But like Turner,
which never mentioned the Brady-Agurs line of cases,58 Drab ignored the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence. Instead,
Drab cited approvingly the decision of another branch of the Florida District Court of Appeal in a child molestation case, State v
Diamond:
There the court held that where compelling circumstances exist so that an accused may be deprived of his due process
51 376 SE2d at 472. The court explained that the defendant had not challenged the
conclusions of the prosecution's physician as inconsistent with the physical findings.
53 546 S2d 54 (Fla Dist Ct App 1989), review denied, 553 S2d 1164 (Fla 1989).
Id at 56.
55 Id at 55.
56 767 SW2d at 559.
57 For example, in Glover, 273 NE2d at 369-70, the defendant alleged a due process
violation but the Illinois Supreme Court framed its holding solely in terms of whether the
trial court abused its discretion, thereby avoiding the constitutional issue entirely.
" See Section II.
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rights unless the complaining witnesses are compelled to undergo a physical examination, the state should be precluded
from introducing as evidence at trial the results of a previous
voluntary examination unless and until the complaining witnesses voluntarily submit to a physical examination by a qualified physician of the defendant's choice.5"
Drab reasoned that the Diamond approach, "with the emphasis on
the method of safeguarding a defendant's due process rights,"
avoided the difficult question of determining whether the trial
court has inherent authority to compel physical examinations of
complainants.6 0 Drab also stated that Diamond was consistent with
the complainant's right of privacy, as guaranteed by the common
law and the Florida Constitution.6 1 Diamond itself, however, did
not mention the Supreme Court's due process decisions, although
it referred both to the state and federal constitutions. 2
E. No Defense Right to Compel a Physical Examination
In contrast to the decisions discussed above, which at least
have purported to recognize that physical examinations might
sometimes be compelled, several state courts have held that there
is no constitutional basis for defense-demanded physical exams of
alleged sex offense victims. Although the California Court of Appeal in People v Nokes relied partly on the exculpatory evidence
rationale, it also questioned whether accused sex offenders would
ever have a right to compel a physical examination that intruded
into the complainant's rectum or vagina. The Nokes defendants
had demanded that the complainants, their two minor children,
submit to physical examinations. In denying the defendants' request, the Court of Appeal concluded that the defendants erred by
suggesting that their constitutional right to present an affirmative
defense "somehow transform[ed] their right to seek discovery'6 3into
an absolute right to discovery, of equal constitutional force.

" Drab, 546 S2d at 55, citing State v Diamond, 553 S2d 1185, 1190 (Fla Dist Ct App
1988). Diamond upheld the trial court's decision to order the complainant, an eight-yearold girl, to submit to a gynecological examination at the insistence of the defendant, who
was charged with raping her. The court held that denying the proposed examination would
deprive the defendant of his right to due process because "the court's power to enforce
constitutional rights stems from the constitution itself." Diamond, 553 S2d at 1190.
10 Drab, 546 S2d at 55.
61Id at 55-56.
" Diamond, 553 S2d at 1190.
"S183 Cal App 3d at 479 (emphasis in original).
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Other jurisdictions have echoed this point. In State ex rel
Wade v Stephens, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the defendant could not compel a physical examination of his ten-yearold daughter, the alleged victim of aggravated sexual assault, because his "controversial discovery order is not supported by either
the federal or state constitution.

64

The Minnesota Court of Ap-

peals ruled in State v Holmes, a child molestation case, that "there
is no right of a defendant to compel the victim of sexual abuse,
especially a child, to submit to a gynecological examination."6' 5 The
court simply did not consider the defendant's motion to be of constitutional dimension: "We have previously indicated the rules of
criminal procedure do not even sanction the deposition of a crime
victim, absent extraordinary circumstances, partly because of the
possible harassment to the victim." ' And although State v Hewett
relied partially on the exculpatory evidence approach, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals also implied that defendants have no
due process right to compulsory physical examinations when it refused to order one unless the complainants or their guardians consented to it.

7

Finally, the Florida Supreme Court denied a com-

pulsory physical examination in State v Smith, a non-sex-offense
case. The defendants in Smith convinced the trial judge that certain prosecution witnesses should be examined for visual acuity
prior to trial.6 8 The state's highest court quashed the order because
neither the common law nor any state rule of criminal procedure
"purport[ed] to authorize a trial court to grant a motion compelling witnesses to submit to a physical examination of any sort. ' 6 9
Because these decisions are consistent with the Court's due
process jurisprudence, they avoid the errors made by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Turner and the Florida District Courts of Appeal in Drab and Diamond. To borrow a phrase from the Nokes
opinion, the defendants in Turner and Drab were mistaken in suggesting that their due process right to present an affirmative defense "transforms their right to seek discovery into an absolute
right to discovery, of equal constitutional force. 1 70 Justice Wintersheimer of the Kentucky Supreme Court, dissenting in Turner,
recognized the fallacy of the defendant's due process theory, con" 724 SW2d 141, 143 (Tex Crim App 1987).
" 374 NW2d 457, 459 (Minn App 1985).
46Id (emphasis in original). See also Lanton v State, 456 S2d 873 (Ala Crim App 1984).
47 376 SE2d at 472.
08 260 S2d 489, 489-90 (Fla 1972).
49 Id at 491.
70 Nokes, 183 Cal App 3d at 479 (emphasis added).
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cluding that Turner had "received all that he was entitled to"
under state rules of criminal procedure and could demand no
more. Wintersheimer explained:
[The defendant] received all results and reports of physical or
mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments
made in connection with the prosecution. He had every opportunity to review the examination procedures and findings of
the testifying prosecution physician. The defense is surely entitled to an opportunity for effective cross-examination but
not cross-examination to every extent the defense might wish.
A review of the record indicates a thorough and extensive
cross-examination by defense counsel. There was nothing to
prevent the defendant from having his own expert testify
at
71
trial in an attempt to impeach the prosecution witness.
Justice Wintersheimer's dissent mirrors the U.S. Supreme Court's
due process jurisprudence in the Brady-Agurs line of cases; it
likely represents the approach the Court would have taken had it
granted certiorari in the case.72
IV.

TRIAL COURTS' INHERENT POWER TO ORDER PHYSICAL
EXAMINATIONS

Due process arguments aside, every state recognizes that trial
courts have the inherent authority to control criminal discovery,
including pretrial disclosure of certain medical reports.73 But the
scope of this discretionary power is unclear. Unlike civil discovery,
where the court may order medical examinations if the condition
of a party is in controversy, 4 there are no statutes-federal or
Turner, 767 SW2d at 562 (Wintersheiner dissenting) (citation omitted).
See note 6.
7 LaFave and Israel, Treatise at 482-83 (cited in note 15).
74 Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies to "physical and mental examinations of persons," and the Advisory Committee notes make clear that "reports of examining physicians are discoverable not only under Rule 35(b) but under other rules as
well." FRCP 35(b)(3) Advisory Committee Note, in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 302
(Foundation, 1988). Rule 35(a) provides: "When the mental or physical condition (including
the blood group) of a party, or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of a
party, is in controversy, the court... may order the party submit to a physical or mental
examination by a physician...." Under Rule 35(b)(1), the party causing the examination to
be made must deliver to the person examined, or the party against whom the motion is
made under 35(a), "a copy of a detailed written report of the examining physician setting
out the physician's findings, including results of all tests made, diagnoses and conclusions,
together with like reports of all earlier examinations of the same condition." The party causing the examination is entitled to obtain like reports by the other party on request-unless
those reports pertain to a non-party over whom the court lacks jurisdiction. Finally, 35(b)(1)
71
72
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state-that expressly provide for court-ordered physical examinations of complainants in criminal proceedings. Many courts simply
state that the defendant's request falls within the trial court's
"sound discretion" to ensure a just disposition of the cause,
thereby avoiding any further analysis.7 Still, a number of jurisdictions have offered some specific analogies to support their view of
inherent authority. This section briefly reviews these analogies,
then discusses the sanctions that trial courts use to compel physical examinations.
A.

The Trial Courts' Analogies
1.

Civil discovery.

Some state courts holding that it is within the "sound discretion" of the trial judge to order a physical examination of the complainant at the defendant's request have analogized to civil cases,
where the judge may order such examinations if the medical condition of the parties is in controversy. 6 The Kentucky Supreme
Court hinted at this approach in Turner v Commonwealth, but admitted that the analogy was problematic because the complainant
in a criminal case is never a party or under the control of a party
to the action.7 Whereas civil plaintiffs voluntarily put their physical condition at issue by filing an action, complainants in sex offense prosecutions do not.
2.

Court-ordered psychiatric exams.

Some courts have derived authority to order physical examinations of complainants in sex offense prosecutions from precedent
or state criminal procedural rules empowering them to order psychiatric examinations in such cases. Indeed, Dean Wigmore and
several other academic commentators of his generation urged that
all complainants in rape and child molestation prosecutions unlets the court sanction non-complying parties by withholding evidence: "[I]f a physician
fails or refuses to make a report the court may exclude the physician's testimony if offered
at trial."

Most states pattern their civil discovery provisions pertaining to medical examinations
after the federal rules. Typical are the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that
either party may request the other party to submit to an examination by a "qualified expert" when the "condition that is the subject of the requested examination is in controversy
and good cause has been shown." Fla RCP 1.360(a) (West, 1990).
75 See, for example, State v Garrett, 384 NW2d 617, 619 (Minn App 1986), discussed in
the text at note 40.
76 See note 74.
"767 SW2d at 559.
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dergo compulsory psychiatric examinations.78 These commentators
feared that innocent defendants would otherwise be convicted, and
warned that complainants might be afflicted with mental disorders
such as pseudologia phantastica, a medical condition in which
"[g]irls assert that they have been raped, sometimes recounting as
true a story they have heard, falsely naming individuals or describing them. '7'9 These views have since been almost universally discredited-and justly So. 8 0 Nevertheless, some courts continue to
claim broad inherent powers to compel psychiatric testimony of
sex offense complainants. For instance, in Ballard v Superior
Court of San Diego County, the California Supreme Court rejected
Wigmore's proposed compulsory psychiatric examinations,," but
held that the trial judge possessed the inherent authority to order
the complainant in a sex offense prosecution to undergo a psychiatric examination if the defendant presented a compelling reason
for doing so."
Other courts have extended this reasoning to physical examinations. For example, in People v Visgar, the defendant was convicted of raping his minor daughter, and the court denied his request that she submit to a physical examination. The defendant
argued on appeal that such an exam would reveal "whether the
complainant's hymen was intact" and was therefore "highly relevant to the credibility of her allegation that defendant had intercourse with her." The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, but only because the defendant was charged with having
"lewdly fondled or touched" the complainant-an offense as to
which a physical examination would not be probative. 3 In reaching
this conclusion, the Visgar court specifically rejected the prosecution's argument that the trial court was powerless to order a physical examination: "the State provides no reason to distinguish be-

78 See note 19.
79 Ballard v Superior Court of San Diego County, 64 Cal 2d 159, 410 P2d 838, 846 n 6
(1966), quoting Roscoe N. Gray, 1 Gray's Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine 940 (M. Bender,
3d ed 1949). "This concern," the Ballard court explained, "is stimulated by the possibility
that a believable complaining witness, who suffers from an emotional condition inducing her
belief that she has been subjected to a sexual offense, may charge some male with that
offense. Thus, the testimony of a sympathy-arousing child may lead to the conviction of an
unattractive defendant, subjecting him to a lengthy prison term." Ballard, 410 P2d at 846.
' See text at notes 85-87.
410 P2d at 848-49.
62

Id at 849.
120 IMl App 3d 584, 457 NE2d 1343 (1983).
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tween psychiatric and physical examinations of the complainant
with regard to a trial court's jurisdiction to order one." 4
But Visgar is very much the exception to the rule. In the analogous area of psychiatric examinations, courts are now extremely
reluctant to order sex offense complainants to submit to testing.
The only state court to adopt Wigmore's approach overruled it
four years later, 5 and many state courts have since restricted trial
courts' ability to order psychiatric examinations.8 " Elsewhere, legislatures have stepped in: the California legislature rejected Ballard,
and other states have taken similar measures to confine the trial
court's discretionary authority to order psychiatric examinations.8 s
3.

Rules authorizing discovery of tangible evidence.

At least one defendant has theorized that a physical examination request comes within state procedural rules authorizing the
discovery of tangible evidence from the prosecution. In State v
Hewett, the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's comparison of the complainant's body to hypothetical white
powder found on his person at the time of his arrest. "Powder,"
the court retorted, "does not have dignity." 8

84

457 NE2d at 1346.

85

Burton v State, 232 Ind 246, 111 NE2d 892 (1953) (requiring complainant to undergo

psychiatric examination), overruled by Wedmore v State, 237 Ind 212, 143 NE2d 649, 654
(1957). Moreover, scholarship on the issue of compulsory psychiatric examinations has
dwindled in recent years. But see Steven W. Feldman, Sexual Offense Prosecutions:The
Defendant's Right to Obtain a Mental Examination of the Complaining Witness, 24 Tenn
Bar J 22 (1988).
8 See State v Drab, 546 S2d at 55 (Florida statute permits trial judges to order psychiatric examination of alleged victims of child molestation but not rape complainants); and
State v Hewett, 376 SE2d at 472 ("The law in this state is that a judge has no discretionary
power to require an unwilling witness to submit to (a psychiatric] examination.") (emphasis
in original).
6' Cal Penal Code § 1112 (West 1985) forbids trial courts from compelling psychiatric
examinations of any witness, including complainants, for the purpose of assessing credibility. The California Court of Appeal interpreted § 1112 as depriving trial judges of their
inherent power to order psychiatric examinations. People v Armbruster, 163 Cal App 3d
660, 664, 210 Cal Rptr 11 (1985). "Due process," Armbruster concluded, "does not compel
pretrial discovery in favor of a defendant." Id. For a similar view, see Ill Rev Stat ch 38,
§ 115-7.1 (1987), providing that "no court may require or order a witness who is the victim
of an alleged sex offense to submit to or undergo either a psychiatric or psychological
examination."
88 376 SE2d 467, 471 (NC App 1989).
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In sum, while these different analogies vary in persuasiveness,
the trial court's inherent power to order discovery conceivably includes compulsory physical examinations of complainants in the
absence of: (1) statutory provisions to the contrary; (2) countervailing common law doctrines; or (3) constitutional rights such as
the complainant's Fourth Amendment guarantee to be free from
unreasonable searches. 9
B. The Trial Courts' Ability to Sanction Complainants Who Refuse to Undergo Physical Examinations
Even if trial courts had the authority to order physical examinations of complainants, how could they enforce it? One option is
to sanction the prosecution. Courts have sometimes done so when
complainants have refused to submit to physical examinations,
both to avoid any perceived unfairness to the defense and to induce the complainant to acquiesce to the proposed exam.
The sanctions can take various forms. In State v Drab, the
Florida District Court of Appeal ordered that "the state should be
precluded from introducing as evidence at trial the results of a previous voluntary examination unless and until the complaining witnesses voluntarily submit to a physical examination by a qualified
physician of the defendant's choice." 90 Under a second approach,
discussed but not adopted by the Texas Court of Appeals in State
ex rel Wade v Stephens, the court would prevent the complainant
from testifying until she consented to the proposed examination. 9 1
A third approach, endorsed by the California Supreme Court in
Ballard, permits the judge to comment on the complainant's refusal to submit to an examination. 2 Finally, one Florida trial court
faced with an unwilling complainant in a sex offense case enjoined
the prosecution until the complainant consented. However, this extreme measure did not survive on appeal.93
With the exception of dismissing the prosecution, these sanctions all appear to fall within the trial court's sound discretion to
provide a just and orderly disposition of the case, provided the
court has discretionary power to compel physical examinations in
the first place. Many courts will no doubt continue to claim this
The Fourth Amendment argument is taken up in Section V.
90 Drab, 546 S2d at 55.
91 724 SW2d at 144-45.
92 410 P2d at 849. Note that Ballard addressed the issue of sanctions in the context of
psychiatric examinations.
93 State v Diamond, 553 S2d 1185, 1189 (Fla Dist Ct App 1988).
$'
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power absent statutory barriers-unless and until complainants
can establish that compulsory physical examinations violate their
Fourth Amendment rights.
V.

APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO COMPULSORY PHYSICAL
EXAMINATIONS OF COMPLAINANTS

The preceding sections have illustrated that the Supreme
Court's limited recognition of a constitutional entitlement to criminal discovery does not support defendants' asserted right to have
their own physicians, or those appointed by the court, examine
complainants in sex offense cases. Of course, that the Supreme
Court has failed to recognize this right does not necessarily mean
that state courts may not order such examinations under their own
authority. Nor, more importantly, does the unavailability of such a
right under the federal Constitution mean that state courts may
not provide it under their own constitutions' analogues to the Due
Process Clause. 4 This section, however, offers an affirmative argument against such state court extensions, showing that not only is
a defense examination of the complainant not compelled by the
Supreme Court's due process analysis, it is in fact prohibited by
the Court's explication of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee
against unreasonable searches.
A physical examination is "compulsory" if the complainant
would not freely consent to it absent court-imposed sanctions. One
might respond that court-ordered examinations are always voluntary in the sense that the complainant remains "free" to drop the
charges. Yet this argument ultimately misses the mark. It is the
prosecution-not the complainant-that brings charges against an
accused sex offender in order to vindicate the interests of society.
Although the victim's reluctance to become involved in a prosecu5
tion may affect the state's decision, it is not dispositive.1
This underscores the crucial distinction between a complainant and a party to a civil suit. Neither the civil plaintiff nor the
complainant consented to the initial physical harm caused by the
defendant. But by bringing a civil suit against the wrongdoer, the
plaintiff consents to placing her physical integrity on the line in
order to gain a personal compensatory benefit. Similarly, the civil

See note 36.
95 As the charging decision is made by the prosecutor, victims play no formal part in
deciding whether to prosecute. See generally Sarah N. Welling, Victims in the Criminal
Process: A UtilitarianAnalysis of Victim Participationin Charging Decisions, 30 Ariz L
Rev 85, 94, 105 (1988).

1990]

Compulsory Physical Examinations

defendant can settle the claim, thus avoiding the court's compelling him to undergo a physical examination. In commenting on
Fourth Amendment interests in the civil context, Professor Tribe
has argued that "the simple fairness of not letting a party both
claim a fact and conceal the only evidence that could verify or disprove it [makes] it impossible to say that the party [is] being
forced to yield a right." Reciprocity, Tribe suggests, helps explain
the Court's decision to uphold the federal rule requiring civil parties to submit to medical examinations when they have put their
physical condition at issue.96
However, a complainant facing a compulsory physical examination cannot settle a claim like a civil defendant or drop the suit
like a plaintiff, for it is the state that brings the charges. There is
no reciprocity or consent in a criminal proceeding. The "benefit" of
enforcing sex offense laws accrues to society and not to the victim.
Forcing complainants to undergo intrusive examinations by defense experts does not result in a reciprocal benefit to complainants beyond the collective welfare. As Tribe warns, "[a] requirement of reciprocity serves to minimize the danger that a bodily
invasion will be justified on the basis that the greater good of society is served thereby." Tribe applies his analysis only to civil discovery, but his reciprocity argument carries even greater force in
the context of compulsory physical examinations. Requiring the alleged victims of sex crimes to submit to physically intrusive inspections for society's sake is impermissible precisely because it
'97
treats them "as a means to the ends of others.
A. The Scope of Fourth Amendment
Complainants

Protection for

Having established that defense examinations of complainants
are in fact "compelled," the next question is whether complainants
who face such examinations are entitled to the same degree of
Fourth Amendment protection as defendants. The Court has not
considered the issue directly, but there is strong indication that its
Fourth Amendment decisions extend by implication to complainants. The Court said as much in Camara v Municipal Court: "It is
surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the

" Laurence H. Tribe,

07 Id at 1334-35.

ConstitutionalLaw 1334 (Foundation, 2d ed 1988).
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individual is suspected of criminal behavior." 8 Not surprisingly,
lower courts have assumed that the Fourth Amendment protects
defendants and complainants alike. For example, in Daryl H. v
Coler the Seventh Circuit applied the Fourth Amendment to physical examinations by government officials of alleged victims of
child abuse. 9 At the state level, the Georgia Supreme Court in
State v Haynie rejected a defense request to force the complainant
to undergo surgery to remove a bullet: "The Fourth Amenidment
right of the victim to be secure against an unreasonable search
must prevail over the right of the accused to obtain evidence for
10 0
his defense."
To determine whether a search of an individual is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has focused on
the degree of physical intrusiveness. The most intrusive searches
warrant a finding of compelling need, the most stringent standard
of antecedent justification. In Winston v Lee, the Court held that
court-ordered surgery on an attempted robbery suspect to remove
a bullet allegedly fired by his victim violated the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights. 10 1 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan held that even the bullet's potential probativeness as evidence
could not justify such an extreme intrusion: "A compelled surgical
intrusion into an individual's body for evidence ... implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to produce evidence of
a crime. '' LO'The proposed surgery in Winston infringed the de10 3
fendant's interest in personal bodily integrity.
The Winston Court contrasted the facts of that case to those
of Schmerber v California,0 where the Court upheld a compelled
blood test of an individual suspected of drunk driving. Winston in
fact began with a quote from Schmerber: "That we today hold that
the Constitution does not forbid the States['] minor intrusions into
an individual's body under stringently limited circumstances in no
way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intru98 387 US 523, 530-31 (1967).
91 801 F2d 893, 900-01 (7th Cir 1986).
100 240 Ga 866, 242 SE2d 713, 715 (1978).
101 470 US 753 (1985). See generally Annotation, Admissibility, in Criminal Case, of

Physical Evidence Obtained without Consent by Surgical Removal from Person'sBody, 41
ALR4th 60 (1985).
102
103
104

470 US at 759.
Id at 766.
384 US 757 (1966).
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sions under other conditions."' 105 The blood tests in Schmerber involved only minimal intrusion. 06 Winston concluded that
"Schmerber recognized society's judgment that blood tests do not
constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual's per7
'0
sonal privacy and bodily integrity.'

Using the Schmerber framework as developed in Winston, the
courts should classify compulsory vaginal and rectal examinations
as "extensive" intrusions and apply the compelling need standard. 108 Admittedly, several lower federal courts have upheld intrusive body cavity searches in the special context of border and
prison searches, 09 where a less stringent standard of antecedent
justification than probable cause generally is required to search for
contraband, such as illegal drugs, hidden in the defendant's vagina ' 0 or rectum."' Yet both border and prison searches are properly viewed as a unique and narrow exception to the Fourth
Amendment's stricture, and courts and commentators have long
seen them as such. 12 Winston applies elsewhere, and its holding
leaves no doubt that only the most demanding antecedent justification-a finding of compelling need-can validate coerced vaginal
or rectal examinations of defendants by government-appointed
physicians. Winston also makes clear that such examinations do
not satisfy the compelling need standard even when they are likely
101

"v'

Winston, 470 US at 755, quoting Schmerber, 384 US at 772.
Schmerber, 384 US at 771.
Winston, 470 US at 762. In its most recent decision involving physical examinations,

the Court upheld a routine administrative drug testing program. In Skinner v Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, several railroad labor groups challenged a plan by the Federal Railroad
Administration to impose routine blood, breath, and urine tests on industry employees. 109
S Ct 1402 (1989). Relying on Schmerber, the Court upheld the random drug-testing program, stressing that the tests were only minimally intrusive. Id at 1417-18.
"' Winston, 470 US at 762.
109 See Annotation, Body Search-Forceor Threat of, 66 ALR Fed 119, 144-59 (1984)
(listing cases).
"' See, for example, United States v Shields, 453 F2d 1235, 1236 (9th Cir 1972) (removal of condom containing heroin from defendant's vagina during border search did not
violate Fourth Amendment because officers had "clear indication" that contraband was present prior to search).
" See, for example, United States v York, 578 F2d 1036, 1041 (5th Cir 1978) (prison
officials need merely show reasonableness, not probable cause, to search inmate's rectum for
partially protruding balloon containing marijuana).
12 See, for example, United States v Martinez-Fuerte,428 US 543, 551, 567 (1976)
(need to police nation's borders and control immigration); York, 578 F2d at 1041 (exigencies
of prison environment and inmates' diminished expectation of privacy); and 66 ALR Fed at
124 ("both prison searches and border searches present unique situations").
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to reveal criminal evidence.11 3 Surely complainants are entitled to
equal, if not greater, Fourth Amendment protection.
B. California's Fourth Amendment Approach to Compulsory
Physical Examinations
California courts have applied the Fourth Amendment to compulsory physical examinations of both defendants and complainants in sex offense prosecutions. These decisions offer a practical
guide for other courts to evaluate defendants' requests that complainants be physically examined by defense or court-appointed
experts.
In People v Scott, the trial court ordered a physician to perform a medical technique that would make an accused sex offender
ejaculate involuntarily, so that the government could use the semen for medical tests. The technique involved massaging the prostate gland through the rectum. The prosecution hoped to gain evidence showing that the defendant suffered from the same sexually
transmitted disease as his daughter, whom he was accused of molesting. 11 4 The California Supreme Court held that the examination proposed in Scott violated the Fourth Amendment."15 The
court employed a balancing test consistent with U.S. Supreme
Court decisions."16 First, said Scott, the court must engage in a balancing test "to determine whether the character of the requested
search is appropriate." Second, the court must be convinced that
there is a compelling need for the evidence likely to be obtained."'
The Scott court then established guidelines to determine
whether the proposed physical examination was reasonable:
Factors which must be considered include the reliability of
the method to be employed, the seriousness of the underlying
criminal offense and society's consequent interest in obtaining
a conviction, the strength of law enforcement suspicions that
evidence of crime will be revealed, the importance of the evi113

470 US at 759; see note 102.

21 Cal 3d 284, 578 P2d 123, 125 (1978).
Id at 128.
11 Id at 127. The court in Scott tailored its Fourth Amendment analysis to conform
with the Court's jurisprudence. For example, it referred to Camara, 387 US at 536-37, for
the view that the Fourth Amendment requires a balancing of "the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails." Scott also attempted to satisfy Schmerber and other
Supreme Court decisions by noting that "the circumstances which permit penetrations beyond the body's surface are particularly limited, since such intrusions may readily offend
those principles of dignity and privacy which are protected by the Fourth Amendment."
114

115

117Id.
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dence sought, and the possibility that the evidence may be
recovered by alternative means less violative of Fourth
Amendment freedoms. These considerations must, in turn, be
balanced against the severity of the proposed intrusion. Thus,
the more intense, unusual, prolonged, uncomfortable, unsafe
or undignified the procedure contemplated, or the more it intrudes upon the essential standards of privacy, the greater
must be the showing for the procedure's necessity. 18
Scott held that the proposed examination would violate the Fourth
Amendment for two reasons. First, the technique involved "the
most intimate of bodily functions, traditionally and universally regarded as private .... ." Second, the evidence desired, "though possibly 'relevant' in the broadest sense of the term," was of limited
probative value." 9
These considerations apply with equal force to compulsory
vaginal and rectal examinations of complainants. That a court-ordered vaginal or anal examination "intrudes upon essential standards of privacy" is obvious. As the California Court of Appeal
subsequently noted in People v Nokes, "any genital or rectal examination has a vastly higher privacy quotient than examination
of the eyes, the hair, the throat or the extremities.'

120

Nokes was

concerned with a proposed rectal examination of the defendants'
son, whom defendants had allegedly sodomized. In denying the defendants' request, the Court of Appeal reasoned that even though
the proposed examination was "simple" and would be carried out
by the defendants' expert physician "with all possible regard for
the son's well-being, an examination encompassing the insertion of
a finger into the son's rectum could not be characterized as simple
and nontraumatic for him. Given the nature of the son's testimony,
the subject of the examination in this case would be a nine-yearold boy who had already been molested on repeated occasions by
the insertion of a finger into his anus."''
As for the second consideration in Scott-the relevancy of the
evidence likely to be obtained by the physical examination-the
court acknowledged that the proposed intrusion might have
yielded circumstantial evidence showing that the defendant suffered from the same disease as the complainant. However, Scott
stressed that such evidence in and of itself could not have proved
118 Id (citations omitted).
129 Id at 128.
120 183 Cal App 3d 468, 479,
121 Id.

228 Cal Rptr 119 (1986).
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that the defendant had infected her.'22 A similar point might also
be made with respect to rectal and vaginal examinations of complainants. Evidence of penetration can be relevant, especially when
the alleged victim is a young child. But rarely can such evidence
positively identify a particular defendant. And even when penetration is a material element of the offense, it may be possible for the
prosecution to prove penetration beyond a reasonable doubt without any physical evidence.
In sum, the Scott balancing test casts doubt on the accused
sex offender's ability to obtain a compulsory rectal or vaginal examination given the powerful Fourth Amendment interests at
stake. It therefore limits constitutionally unwarranted criminal discovery that infringes on victims' rights.
CONCLUSION

Defendants charged with sex offenses are increasingly demanding that their own medical experts, or independent experts
appointed by the trial court, conduct physical examinations of
complainants. They claim that due process entitles them to such
exams. Most state courts that have considered the issue have
avoided the constitutional inquiry and framed their decisions
solely in terms of whether the trial court abused its inherent discretionary power by ordering a physical examination against the
complainant's wishes. But a handful of decisions do conclude that
defendants have a due process right to compel such exams. This
minority view contravenes the pertinent Supreme Court jurisprudence, which carefully limits the scope of criminal discovery.
By applying the Fourth Amendment to compulsory physical
examinations, courts can provide a modicum of protection to the
alleged victims of crime. The Fourth Amendment approach shifts
trial judges' focus away from absolute discovery rights for defendants and toward a proper recognition of the uniquely intrusive nature of physical examinations of complainants-mostly young children-who may have been victimized by crimes of extreme
depravity. Forcing complainants to submit to intrusive physical inspections as a prerequisite for enforcing laws designed to protect
children hinders the enforcement of those laws. 123 And it punishes
Scott, 578 P2d at 128.
As in the context of compulsory psychiatric examinations, a prosecution may not be
contingent on any physical examination. Yet requiring a vaginal or rectal examination on
behalf of the defendant may prevent a prosecution dependent on the witness testimony of
the victim, who might refuse to testify if coerced into an intrusive examination.
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crime victims who seek to vindicate themselves and society
through the justice system. Complainants should not face this
Hobson's Choice, especially when the sacrifice is unnecessary. Defendants' due process rights are already protected; prosecutors
must disclose to them any exculpatory evidence that a consensual
examination might reveal. The Fourth Amendment approach to
compulsory physical examinations would restore the proper limits
of defense discovery while recognizing that crime victims also have
constitutional rights.

